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Abstract 
 
This chapter examines the structure, adoption, usage, and impact of non-union grievance 
procedures. Non-union grievance procedures vary widely in their structure from informal open 
door policies to elaborate peer review and arbitration based procedures. Adoption of these 
procedures is driven by a range of factors including union substation, litigation avoidance, and 
as part of human resource strategies focused on promoting high commitment from employees. 
Non-union grievance procedures tend to be used less frequently that their union counterparts, 
but usage levels vary based on the structure of the procedure with those incorporating non-
managerial decision-makers exhibiting higher usage levels. Although non-union grievance 
procedures are often put in place with the goal of enhancing organizational justice, a common 
problem is retaliation within the organization against grievants who use the procedures. 
 
Keywords: non-union grievance procedures, organizational justice, alternative dispute 
resolution, arbitration, human resource management, employment law 
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Introduction 
 
             Non-union grievance procedures were often traditionally regarded as a residual 
category. In examining workplace dispute resolution, the primary historical focus was on the 
well-established grievance procedures found in unionized workplaces. Even with the increased 
focus on individual employment rights and declining emphasis on collective bargaining and 
union representation, the emphasis in dispute resolution has been on the role of the courts and 
public administrative and adjudicatory agencies. Meanwhile grievance procedures in non-union 
workplaces, where examined at all, have been relegated to a secondary role as poor copies of 
their counterparts in unionized workplaces or limited supplements to formal public procedures 
for enforcing individual employment rights.  
 
              Yet these perspectives miss the increasingly central role of non-union grievance 
procedures in resolving conflicts for employees. For the now 93% percent of American private 
sector employees who are not represented by unions, non-union grievance procedures 
represent the only workplace dispute resolution mechanism potentially available to them 
(Colvin, 2012). Similarly, although litigation in the public courts is notionally available to all 
employees, in practice relatively few cases will provide the type of substantive claims and 
potential damages that can produce a plausible claim to be litigated. For most employees and 
most workplace disputes, non-union grievance procedures will be the only avenue available to 
attempt to achieve some redress for unfair treatment in the workplace.  
 
              Non-union grievance procedures are characterized by a high degree of diversity in their 
origins, structures, usage, and impact on the workplace (Westin and Felieu, 1988; Ewing, 1989). 
Procedures range in type from relatively simple open door policies to elaborate peer review 
panels with formal jury-like procedures to provide due process. Motivations for their 
introduction range from efforts to improve management human resource practices to efforts to 
ward off union organizing drives and protect the organization from lawsuits (Colvin, 2003a). 
Some non-union grievance procedures are virtually never used by employees whereas others 
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are utilized at levels closer to those found in grievance procedures in unionized workplaces. 
More effective non-union grievance procedures may serve to correct poor management 
decision-making and enhance employee commitment and retention, yet employees who utilize 
non-union grievance procedures can also be subject to retaliation and punishment (Lewin, 
1990). The role and impact of non-union grievance procedures in the workplace is a complex 
and varied one, not subject to simple, generalized characterizations as either a panacea or a 
canard in the search for workplace justice. In examining non-union grievance procedures, the 
initial focus of this chapter will be on the experience with these procedures in the United 
States. The reason for this emphasis is that American organizations were the first to adopt 
these procedures and they are clearly the most widespread and best developed in the U.S. This 
reflects both the relative weakness of American unions and resulting large non-union sector of 
the U.S. economy and also the strong role of individual employment rights litigation threats 
which encourage many American companies to adopt procedures. However, after examining 
the American experience in this area, I will turn to examining that of other countries, in 
particularly some of the alternative regulatory approaches affecting procedures found in 
different countries. 
 
A Typology of Procedures 
 
              What are we talking about when we refer to non-union grievance procedures? An initial 
problem is to define the boundaries of this phenomenon. Although conflicts arise in all 
workplaces, in not all is there some type of procedure to resolve these conflicts. In smaller and 
more informal organizations, conflicts may be handled directly by managers without recourse 
to any systematic procedure. Instead a manager may use his or her individual discretion to deal 
with a complaint from an employee or to respond to a conflict that is observed to be occurring 
in the workplace. This is certainly a form of conflict management, but does not rise to the level 
of a grievance procedure. If we are simply dealing with managerial discretion in responding to 
workplace conflict, then we may find one approach being used one day and an entirely 
different one another. Indeed the manager may choose to respond to one grievance raised by 
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an employee and ignore or suppress a different grievance raised by another. As a threshold, the 
existence of a nonunion grievance procedure implies that the organization has some type of 
standard, systematic procedure to respond to employee grievances. There may be flexibility in 
how conflicts are handled and elements of discretion retained by decision-makers, but the key 
factor is that there needs to be some type of formal procedure through which an employee’s 
grievance can be raised and resolved. 
 
              If we start with this relatively basic definition, survey evidence suggests that a majority 
of American non-union workplaces have some type of grievance procedure (Berenbeim, 1980; 
Delaney, Lewin, and Ichniowski, 1989; Edelman, 1990; Feuille and Chachere, 1995; Colvin, 
2003a). The simplest of these are open door policies, which typically involve a statement of 
organizational policy so that employees should feel free to bring concerns or complaints to 
management who will then attempt to address the problem (Feuille and Delaney, 1992; 
Wheeler, Klaas, and Mahony, 2004; Colvin, Klaas, and Mahony, 2006). Open door policies may 
specify who complaints can be brought to, often the employee’s supervisor, a more senior 
manager, or a human resources representative. Open door policies may include statements 
that there will be no retaliation against employees who bring complaints under the policy. 
 
              Although many open door policies involve little more than aspirational statements by 
the organization with little to back them up, some organizations undertake more elaborate 
efforts to encourage and monitor usage of the open door policy. Perhaps the most extensive 
system based around this concept is IBM’s open door procedure, which dates back to the more 
informal open door policy followed by the company’s Chairman Tom Watson in the 1950s 
(Ewing, 1989). IBM’s modern open door procedure is a formalized investigation procedure, 
under which employee complaints trigger the rapid deployment of an executive level manager 
to investigate the conflict and report the results back to the Chairman’s office. Although 
commitment of this level of resources and effort is unusual, open door policies are a 
widespread feature of American non-union workplaces and may be an important supplement 
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to other types of non-union grievance procedures. 
 
              Most non-union grievance procedures involve some structure for appeal of an adverse 
decision against the grieving employee (Feuille and Chachere, 1995; Colvin et al., 2006). A 
common example would be a disciplinary decision by a supervisor, such as a warning for 
absenteeism or a suspension for workplace misconduct, that the employee thought was 
unjustified. Under a typical procedure, the employee can file a grievance seeking to have this 
disciplinary decision reversed. A central feature of grievance procedures then is who the 
grievance can be appealed to. In many procedures there are multiple levels or steps of appeal 
to successively higher level decision-makers. The neutrality and independence of these 
decision-makers is a central feature determining the degree of due process that the grievance 
procedure provides. We can classify different types of nonunion grievance procedures by the 
decision-makers in the procedure and by their degree of independence from the normal 
management chain of command. 
 
              Many basic non-union grievance procedures simply instruct the employee to pursue 
complaints up the standard chain of command. The first step might involve discussing the 
concern with the employee’s supervisor. The grievance could be pursued further by raising it 
with the next highest level of manager with supervisory responsibility. The procedure may 
terminate with an appeal to the plant or facility manager or it may provide that the employee 
can appeal the grievance to a more senior level executive at the divisional or corporate level. 
Grievance procedures of this nature have the advantage from the organizational perspective 
that they respect the existing structure of managerial authority reflected in the chain of 
command. Lower level decisions may be reversed by higher management, but this is done in 
the same way that lower level operational decisions can also be reviewed and reversed by 
higher level decision-makers in the organization. At the same time, this replication of the 
existing chain of command structure provides the grieving employees with relatively little 
independence of review in the appeal. The fear will be that higher level managers will have a 
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natural tendency to support and affirm the decisions of the subordinates who report to them. 
 
              To provide more independent review of grievance and reduce the danger of simply 
reinforcing the existing decision-making process, some non-union grievance procedures provide 
for review of complaints by managers outside the direct chain of command above the 
employee. For example, this may involve a procedure step in which rather than an executive 
from the employee’s own division reviewing the grievance, it is instead reviewed by an 
executive from another division within the company. Having more senior executives review the 
grievance in later steps of the procedure may also be directed at achieving a similar goal of 
removing the decision-making in the review process from the immediate managerial hierarchy 
of the specific plant or facility involved. In addition to providing a degree of independence from 
the most closely involved managerial actors, shifting decision-making in the grievance 
procedure to a higher level in the organization may also serve to provide more focus on the 
interests of the company as a whole in resolving the conflict. Lower level management may be 
more likely to be concerned about reaffirming their authority in the workplace and prioritizing 
the production goals of their specific unit in reviewing grievances. By contrast, higher level 
management, particularly if not directly connected to the management of the unit where the 
grievance arose, are more likely to emphasize broader organizational priorities such as ensuring 
consistency in application of organizational policies and protecting the organization from 
external threats of litigation or union organizing. These organizational priorities may lead such 
decision-makers to provide a more rigorous review aimed at ensuring the employee was not 
treated unfairly. 
 
              Management appeals boards provide a procedural structure that emphasizes these 
objectives of providing review by decision-makers who are higher up in the organization and 
less directly connected to the management of the specific unit involved in the grievance (Feuille 
and Chachere, 1995). Under management appeals board procedures, a panel of executives, 
usually three in number, hears and decides the employee’s grievance (Colvin et al., 2006). The 
executives on the panel will commonly include both operations and human resources managers 
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as well as executives both from the grievant’s division and from other divisions in the company. 
Given the relatively elaborate and expensive nature of this step, taking substantial managerial 
time, it is usually used as a later step in grievance procedures after efforts to resolve the 
grievance at the workplace level have been unsuccessful. The use of management appeals 
boards provides grievant with the benefits of multiple decision-makers reviewing the case and 
the perspectives of managers less directly connected to the situation. Although this provides 
more independent review than typical non-union grievance procedures, it still involves 
managers serving as the decision-makers in the procedure. By contrast, to provide greater 
independence and neutrality in non-union grievance procedures some organizations have 
adopted procedures that include non-managerial decision-makers.                
 
              Peer review procedures are an innovation that employs non-managerial employees 
from within the organization as decision-makers in the grievance procedure (Colvin, 2003a, 
2003b). A peer review panel will commonly consist both of employees who are peers of the 
grievant and managers, with the peer employees being a majority on the panel (Feuille and 
Chachere, 1995). A common structure is to have a five-member panel with three peer 
employees and two managers (Colvin, 2004a). Peer review panel procedures first become well-
known through the example of a GE plant that adopted them in the 1970s in response to a 
series of union organizing drives. By providing the peer review panels, management at the plant 
hoped to better respond to employee grievances and convince the workers that they could 
obtain fair treatment and employee involvement in decision-making through a non-union 
procedure. Research suggests that peer review panel procedures have been adopted in 
increasing numbers of organizations in recent decades (Colvin, 2003a). 
 
              Arbitration in the workplace dispute resolution arena has been strongly associated with 
the grievance procedures of unionized workplaces. Final and binding decision-making by 
independent neutral Labor Arbitrators as the last step of grievance procedures is one of the 
most long-standing and stable elements of American labor relations. By contrast, until recently 
arbitration was virtually absent from non-union workplaces. The only exceptions were a small 
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number of employers who had introduced arbitration as the final step of their non-union 
procedures to mimic the union system of labor arbitration and provide a substitute for union 
representation to guard against organizing drives. The best known example of this is the non-
union grievance procedure at Northrop, which since the late 1940s has featured arbitration as 
its final step (Westin and Felieu, 1988). Despite the positive experiences of Northrop with this 
system, the vast majority of non-union employers remained unwilling to turn over decision-
making authority in their organizations to an independent third-party neutral arbitrator. This 
aversion to arbitration in the non-union workplace changed dramatically in the 1990s. As will 
be described in more detail in the section titled “Factors Leading to Procedure Adoption”, a 
shift in the law of arbitration opened up the possibility for employers to use non-union 
arbitration agreements as a shield against claims being brought against them in the courts. 
Through the 1990s and 2000s arbitration procedures focused on potential employment law 
claims spread rapidly, with estimates suggesting around a quarter of non-union employees 
being covered by them by the early 2000s (Colvin, 2007) and perhaps by a third more at present 
(Lewin, 2008). 
 
              The types of procedures described so far all involve an appeal by the employee to a 
decision-maker who determines the outcome of the dispute. In these determination type 
procedures, the employee is presenting a grievance to the decision-maker in hopes of receiving 
a decision with some type of remedy (Colvin et al., 2006). A separate category of procedures 
are those that do not involve a determination by a decision-maker, but rather an effort to 
facilitate a negotiated or consensual resolution of the conflict. The classic example of a 
facilitation type procedure is mediation. In traditional third-party mediation, an independent 
neutral mediator attempts to assist the parties to a dispute in reaching a negotiated resolution. 
Some non-union grievance procedures include mediation as a step, particularly as a prelude to 
arbitration in procedures that use arbitration as the final step of the procedure (General 
Accounting Office, 1997; Colvin, 2004a). 
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              Where effective, these mediation procedures hold the potential for producing faster, 
cheaper, and more mutually satisfactory resolutions to conflicts than the more formal and 
involved procedures of arbitration. In addition to formal mediation by outside third-party 
neutrals, some non-union grievance procedures include internal mediation steps where 
someone within the organization attempts to mediate the dispute. Human resource managers 
often do this on an ad hoc basis, but some organizations have attempted to systematize this 
process by providing structured mediation training and making it a defined step within the 
grievance procedure. Another approach to internal mediation is the use of peer mediation, 
where regular employees not specialized in the employment relations function serve as 
mediators for disputes among their fellow employees (Lipsky, Seeber, and Fincher, 2003). This 
will often involve a program of training given to employees who volunteer to serve as peer 
mediators within the organization. 
 
              Ombudsperson offices provide a more extended organizational commitment to 
facilitating conflict resolution in the workplace. An ombudsperson is a designated neutral within 
the organization tasked with responding to employee concerns and complaints (Kolb, 1987; 
Bingham and Chachere, 1999). The ombudsperson will not try to determine the outcome of a 
complaint, but rather uses a range of techniques including information gathering, conciliation, 
and mediation, to attempt to facilitate a satisfactory resolution of the conflict. An 
ombudsperson serves as an organizational neutral, situated outside of the standard chain of 
command and emphasizing confidentiality of complaints received to protect against retaliation 
toward employees using the office. At the same time, the ombudsperson works within the 
organization, and successful ombudsmen tend to have significant experience with and 
knowledge of the organization which allows them to more effectively navigate the internal 
policies, structures, and politics of the workplace in helping to resolve conflicts. Although many 
ombudsmen effectively balance these roles, they can cause tensions where a conflict develops 
into a more formal legal claim against the organization and the ombudsperson’s role as a 
neutral may be compromised by demands to testify in legal proceedings (Cooper, Nolan, and 
Bales, 2000). Ombudsperson offices are used in a number of larger non-union firms, however, 
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the expense of hiring someone into a full-time in-house neutral role makes this type of 
procedure impractical for small or mid-sized organizations.  
 
Factors Leading to Procedure Adoption 
 
              Why do non-union organizations adopt grievance procedures? In the United States, 
there is no legal requirement that an employer have any type of internal workplace dispute 
resolution procedure for employees. In non-union workplaces there is no institutionalized actor 
like the union pushing for the adoption of procedures in organized workplaces. Nor do non-
union employers receive the benefits of grievance procedures that accrue to their unionized 
counterparts of having the procedure substitute for the disruptions of direct industrial action or 
attempts to enforce collective bargaining agreements through the courts. It might be expected 
that the non-unionized employer would simply rely on the prerogatives of managerial authority 
and use its own discretion on how to deal with problems in the workplace. Indeed, the 
continued adherence to the doctrine of employment at-will in American employment would 
seem to invite this assumption of discretionary authority by management of non-union 
organizations. Although many organizations do follow this approach, in practice, as we have 
seen in Section II, most non-union employers do adopt some type of formal grievance 
procedure. The reasons they do so derive primarily from three major forces or pressures upon 
management of non-union organizations. 
 
              The first force leading to the adoption of non-union grievance procedures is the threat 
of union organizing. Virtually all American private sector employers would prefer to operate 
without the constraints of collective bargaining and many take active steps to manage their 
human resources in such a way as to reduce the likelihood of union organizing (Kochan, Katz, 
and McKersie, 1994). Union organizing drives often focus on issues of unfair treatment in the 
workplace and research suggests that campaigns with a justice focus are more likely to be 
successful (Bronfenbrenner, 1997). A major reason for this is that union organizers can tout the 
benefits of having a union grievance procedure, culminating in arbitration before a third-party 
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neutral, to remedy unfair treatment by management. Whereas non-union employees may be 
skeptical of promises of enhanced wages or job security, which depend to a large degree on the 
reactions of management, union organizers can more credibly promise to vigorously represent 
employees through the grievance procedure, whatever management’s reaction. 
 
              A non-union employer concerned about the threat of union organizing drive can seek to 
at least partially substitute for the potential benefits of unionization by adopting a non-union 
grievance procedure. If employees believe that they can get redress for workplace problems 
through this procedure, then they will see less need for organizing a union to obtain the 
benefits of a union grievance procedure. Many early non-union grievance procedures were 
introduced for exactly this reason (Berenbeim, 1980). The non-union arbitration procedure at 
Northrop was a notable example, where the strong organizing threat of unions in the aerospace 
industry led the company to adopt a procedure that closely paralleled union procedures, 
including the critical final arbitration step (Westin and Felieu, 1988). In practice, most non-
union organizations did not need to go so far in mimicking union grievance procedures to 
achieve some union substitution effect. Rather, as long as the procedure has some credibility 
among employees and provides a degree of check on managerial decision-making, it can have 
the potential to reduce the relative advantage of a union grievance procedure and diminish the 
strength of the union organizing motivation.  
 
              Peer review panel procedures provide a strong example of how employers have 
adopted more sophisticated union substitution strategies in the design of non-union grievance 
procedures. A key aspect of justice arguments in union organizing drives is that the union can 
serve as a check on unilateral management decision-making in the workplace. Peer review 
procedures address this concern directly by providing non-managerial employees with the 
majority of votes on the panel deciding grievances. This form of employee involvement in 
decision-making also has the benefit of avoiding the limitations on employer dominated 
employee representation schemes in section 8(a)(2) of the US National Labor Relations Act 
(Colvin, 2003a). Peer review panels are a relatively time and effort intensive procedure for 
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dealing with grievances and many managers are reluctant to turn over such important decision-
making functions to low-level employees (Colvin, 2004a). As a result, research findings suggest 
that adoption of peer review procedures is more likely in organizations that are subject to 
stronger union organizing threats, such as in industries like telecommunications and autos, 
where American unions retain greater strength (Colvin, 2003a). 
 
              The second major force leading to the adoption of non-union grievance procedures is 
the threat of litigation. A key factor in the relatively widespread adoption of non-union 
grievance procedures in the United States is the unique nature of the American employment 
law system and the pressures it places on employers. Prospects for employees bringing an 
employment lawsuit through the American court system are characterized by both relatively 
low probabilities of success and the chance of relatively large rewards where successful. 
American employment law continues to be founded on the basic principle of employment at-
will under which an employer can terminate an employee for good reason, bad reason, or no 
reason at all without any obligation to provide prior notice or severance. In order to bring a 
successful employment lawsuit it is necessary to fall under one of the exceptions to this rule. 
Courts in most states recognize a limited number of common law exceptions to the at-will rule, 
such as the public policy exception which has been invoked where the termination violates 
some strong principle of public policy. In practice, this exception has been limited to unusual 
situations such as where the employee has been terminated for refusing to commit a crime. 
 
              A broader set of exceptions to the at-will rule comes from the various employment 
statutes enacted by state and federal governments. The prohibitions in the National Labor 
Relations Act on disciplining or dismissing an employee based on union organizing activity were 
among the first of these exceptions. The largest category of exceptions in recent years has 
come from the broad range of anti-discrimination legislation enacted from the 1960s through 
the present. American anti-discrimination law now bars employment decisions being based on 
factors such as race, gender, religion, national origin, age, disability, and in some states sexual 
orientation or smoking. To be successful in the courts, however, it is necessary that employees 
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be able to prove that an adverse employment decision was based on one of these prohibited 
grounds, which is often a challenging task. 
 
              The litigation process in the courts can be both time consuming and expensive, with 
cases on average taking almost two years to get to trial (Eisenberg and Schlanger, 2003). 
Research suggests that employment discrimination litigation is less likely to be successful at 
trial than other plaintiffs and more likely to have awards in their favor overturned on appeal 
(Clermont and Schwab, 2004). Despite these substantial barriers to bringing a claim, employees 
who are ultimately successful in the American courts can win substantial amounts of damages. 
A study of employment discrimination cases in the federal courts found a median award 
amount of $110,000 and a mean award of $301,000, with a skewed distribution of outcomes 
including a number of very large awards of over a million dollars (Eisenberg and Schlanger, 
2003). Research on employment decisions in the California state courts found an even higher 
median damage award of $296,991 (Oppenheimer, 2003). 
 
              The picture that emerges of employment litigation in the United States is of a high risk, 
high reward system for employees. For organizations facing the threat of litigation, this means 
that despite the relative employer-favorability of the at-will rule, they are subject to the 
pressures of a slow-moving, highly uncertain legal process and the risk of a large damage award 
from the occasional lawsuit that is successful. How do non-union grievance procedures help in 
this situation? The most direct way in which grievance procedures can prevent lawsuits is by 
resolving conflicts in the workplace before they can develop into legal cases. This can occur 
directly through providing the employee with a remedy for unfair treatment in the workplace. It 
may also occur more indirectly by allowing the employer to identify and deal with problematic 
managers or policies that could be the potential cause of future lawsuits (Colvin, 2004a). 
 
              Another reason that employers may have adopted non-union grievance procedures in 
response to the expansion of employment laws is the normative influence of the due process 
models established by the legal system (Edelman, 1990; Sutton, Dobbin, Meyer, and Scott, 
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1994; Sutton and Dobbin, 1996). Institutional theory researchers have argued that the 
uncertainty of the legal environments influenced organizations to adopt procedures that would 
provide signals of compliance by appearing to provide due process for employees (Edelman, 
1990; Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger, 1999). Professionals in fields such as law and human 
resource management are argued to have played particularly important roles in structuring and 
encouraging organizations to conform to these normative influences (Edelman, Abraham, and 
Erlanger, 1992). Research from this perspective found associations between changes in the 
employment law environment and the expansion over time of the adoption of non-union 
grievance procedures (Edelman, 1990; Sutton et al., 1994; Sutton and Dobbin, 1996). 
 
              Whereas institutional theory researchers have emphasized the more indirect, 
normative influences emanating from the employment law environment, in the last two 
decades the legal system has provided more direct, concrete incentives for the adoption of 
non-union grievance procedures, particularly for those using arbitration. In a 1991 decision, 
Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane, the Supreme Court for the first time held that a legal claim 
based on an employment statute could be arbitrable under an arbitration agreement. The 
Gilmer decision held out the possibility to employers of establishing nonunion arbitration 
procedures for their workforces that would divert legal claims out of the courts and into a 
private arbitration procedure designated by the employer (Stone, 1999; Colvin, 2003a). In a 
2001 decision, Circuit City v. Adams, the Supreme Court confirmed that an arbitration 
agreement that was part of an employment contract would be enforceable under the Federal 
Arbitration Act. 
 
              The result of these decisions is that an American employer can require its non-union 
employees to sign an agreement to arbitrate any potential legal claim against the company, 
including statutory claims such as those under the anti-discrimination laws, as a mandatory 
term and condition of employment. Based on American arbitration law, decisions by these 
private employment arbitrators cannot be reviewed by the courts apart from in very narrow 
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circumstances such as fraud or misconduct by the arbitrator. 
 
              From being a relatively rare phenomenon at the beginning of the 1990s (Feuille and 
Chachere, 1995), non-union arbitration expanded rapidly in the 1990s and 2000s (Colvin, 
2003a; Lewin, 2008) as employers saw it as an opportunity to escape from the risks and 
uncertainty of the public court system. Research has found that organizations were more likely 
to adopt non-union arbitration procedures where they were more exposed to potential 
litigation threats (Colvin, 2003a). An interesting side effect of the expansion of non-union 
arbitration is that many employers used the occasion of introducing arbitration as an 
opportunity to review and upgrade other aspects of their non-union grievance procedures 
(Colvin, 2004a). The result is that the shift in the law of arbitration had an indirect effect of 
producing a more general expansion of grievance procedures.  
 
              Union organizing and litigation threats represent external forces exerting pressure on 
organizations. In addition to these external factors, organizations also adopt non-union 
grievance procedures based on internal considerations related to their human resource 
strategies. Driving these internal motivations is the idea that enhancing fair treatment of 
employees will produce tangible benefits for the organization. 
 
              One major research perspective suggesting the value of adopting non-union grievance 
procedure is organizational justice theory. Organizational justice theory argues that the degree 
to which employees perceive organizational decisions as either having or lacking justice will 
affect important attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. Justice theory argues that there are 
multiple dimensions of justice perceptions, including procedural, distributive, and interpersonal 
justice (Colquitt, 2001). The identification of the importance of procedural justice perceptions 
has particular relevance to the adoption of non-union grievance procedures, since they provide 
mechanisms specifically designed to provide employees with enhanced procedural fairness in 
challenging organizational decisions (Sheppard, Lewicki, and Minton, 1992; Folger and 
Cropanzano, 1998). In a relatively direct test of this premise, Olson-Buchanan (1996) conducted 
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an experimental study in which she found that availability of access to a grievance procedure 
that enhanced procedural justice increased employee willingness to continue working for the 
organization. 
 
              Another theoretical perspective supporting internal organizational motivations for 
adopting procedures is exit-voice theory, originally developed by Hirschman (1970) and most 
famously adapted to the labor relations setting by Freeman and Medoff (1984).  Exit-voice 
theory argues that when confronted with deterioration in their employment situation, 
employees have two potential options: exit, usually involving quitting; and voice, giving 
expression to the dissatisfaction in hopes of remedying the situation. To the degree that voice 
options are enhanced, use of exit will be decreased, thereby saving the employer such costs of 
turnover as loss of existing employee skills and experience and the need to recruit, select, and 
train new employees. In their formulation, Freeman and Medoff primarily focused on the voice 
function of unions, but also acknowledged that non-union grievance procedures could 
potentially provide a similar voice function. Subsequent research on employee turnover in the 
telecommunications industry evidence found that in addition to the well-established exit-voice 
relationship in unionized workplaces, non-union grievance procedures in the form of peer 
review panels were also associated with lower quit rates (Batt, Colvin, and Keefe, 2002). 
 
              The degree to which organizations adopt non-union grievance procedures in order to 
enhance employee commitment and reduce turnover is likely to depend on the overall human 
resource strategy followed by the organization. Human resource strategies premised on 
fostering high levels of employee skill, commitment, and participation in the workplace depend 
to a greater degree on having a relatively stable, experienced workforce and are more likely to 
be undermined by employee perceptions of injustice in organizational decision-making. Some 
studies have found positive associations between high performance or high commitment work 
systems and the adoption of non-union grievance procedures (Huselid, 1995; Colvin, 2004b). 
The nature of the work system may also influence the structure of the grievance procedure that 
is adopted, such as a positive association between the use of self-managed work teams and the 
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adoption of peer review procedures which similarly rely on group employee involvement in 
decision-making (Colvin, 2003a). 
 
Procedure Usage 
 
              What do we know about how non-union grievance procedures operate? There is a 
surprisingly small body of research that has attempted to answer these questions. One reason 
for the limited extent of research in this area is the difficulty in gaining access to organizations 
to gather data on what are from an employer’s perspective private, internal procedures. 
Although understandable from an employer’s viewpoint, this private structure for dispute 
resolution is more problematic from a public policy perspective when we consider that among 
the conflicts resolved through these procedures are disputes over workplace discrimination, 
sexual harassment, and other issues that implicate public statutory rights. The result of the 
difficulties in gaining access to organizations to conduct research in this area is that we may be 
seeing a biased sample in which companies that operate procedures feature relatively high 
degrees of fairness, and due process protections are more willing to provide access to 
researchers. This could create a more positive picture of procedures than would be reflected in 
a more comprehensive sample of organizations. With that proviso in mind, what does the 
existing research tell us? 
 
              Some of the earliest systematic research on non-union grievance procedures was 
conducted by David Lewin in the 1980s. Lewin (1987) gathered data on the operation of 
procedures in a set of non-union organizations that had relatively well-developed formal 
processes for dispute resolution. The companies Lewin examined all had multi-step procedures 
featuring appeals to successively higher levels of management, but differed in the final step of 
the procedure with one company having the VP of HR as the final decision-maker, another with 
the CEO as the final step, and a third with arbitration by an outside third-party neutral as the 
final step. 
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              The findings of this study indicated both commonalities and differences across 
organizations. Grievance rates were relatively similar across the companies—around 4–6 
grievances annually per 100 employees, a rate about half of that found in typical American 
unionized workplaces. Rates of appeal dropped with each successive step in the procedures, 
with few grievances going beyond the second step involving review by a midlevel functional or 
HR manager. Among grievances that did proceed farther, the highest appeal rate to the final 
step was in the company which used arbitration as its last stage, which had an average of 0.4 
grievances going to the final step annually per 100 employees compared to an average of only 
0.1 final step grievances in the other companies (Lewin, 1987). This finding suggests that the 
use of third-party decision makers in the procedure may have a substantial effect in 
encouraging usage by employees. 
 
              In addition to the question of grievance rates, Lewin also examined employee win rates 
in these procedures. A striking finding was that win rates were relatively similar across all 
companies and steps of the procedures. Employee win rates ranged from 40–50% of grievances 
in all three companies in the first three steps of the procedures (Lewin, 1987). Employee win 
rates did go up to 50–65% in the final step of each of the procedures, but overall the 
noteworthy finding is the similarity of outcomes. One explanation that may account for this 
finding is that employees are rational actors in deciding to file a grievance and managers are 
likewise rational in deciding whether to resolve a matter before the next step in the procedure. 
Employees may be reluctant to file grievances where they have relatively low chances of 
winning, either out of unwillingness to expend the effort of pursuing a grievance or out of fear 
of retaliation from managers for becoming a troublemaker. Conversely in situations where the 
employee has a relatively strong grievance with a high probability of success, then managers 
will have a greater incentive to resolve the matter informally before it consumes time and 
creates embarrassment by becoming a formal grievance. The result is the grievances most likely 
to be pursued are those in the middle, where there is some prospect of success but not a high 
certainty that the employee will be successful. This prediction corresponds to the finding of 
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mid-range employee win rates.  
 
              In a subsequent study, I investigated the question of whether use of non-managerial 
decision-makers in procedures affected usage and outcomes across a broader sample of 
organizations (Colvin, 2003b). In a sample of 180 establishments in the telecommunications 
industry, I found that that grievance rates were significantly higher in non-union procedures 
that included either arbitration or peer review. Whereas the annual rate of grievances of 
disciplinary decisions was only 1.3 per 100 employees under procedures with managerial 
decision-makers, the rate was 2.9 per 100 employees under peer review procedures, and 3.2 
per 100 employees under procedures with arbitration as the final step (Colvin, 2003b). To 
account for variation in the underlying level of workplace conflict, I also calculated the 
percentage of all disciplinary decisions that were appealed. The results were similar, with 11% 
of disciplinary decisions being grieved under procedures with managerial decision-makers, 30% 
of decisions being grieved under peer review procedures, and 34% being grieved under 
procedures with arbitration as the final step (Colvin, 2003b). As suggested by Lewin’s findings, 
employee win rates did not much vary by type of procedure, averaging 30–45%; however, the 
influence of the nature of the procedure on the likelihood of appealing a decision made a 
bigger difference. Overall in establishments that had only managerial decision-makers in their 
procedures, on average only 2.7% of disciplinary decisions were successfully reversed through 
filing grievances. By contrast, 9.9% of disciplinary decisions were successfully appealed under 
peer review procedures and 11.1% under procedures with arbitration as the final step (Colvin, 
2003b). These differences indicate that employees are more willing to bring grievances where 
the procedures provide the due process protection of nonmanagerial decision-makers and this 
ultimately produces more cases in which the employee is successfully able to achieve a change 
in the decision being challenged.  
 
              Procedure structure is only part of what determines usage of non-union grievance 
procedures. Another important factor is the nature of the workplace employment system. 
Organizations with work and human resource systems that invest more heavily in employees 
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and provide employees with greater involvement in workplace decision making are more likely 
to provide employees with more effective grievance procedures and reduced levels of 
workplace conflict (Colvin, 2004a). In a recent study, I examined the impact of variation in the 
structure of procedures and in the nature of work and human resource systems on workplace 
dispute resolution outcomes (Colvin, 2013). Establishments that had non-union grievance 
procedures with more due process protections, including steps with non-managerial decision-
makers, had higher employee grievance rates and a greater likelihood of appealing disciplinary 
decisions. However, the use of high involvement work systems, including employee 
participation systems such as teams and high levels of employee training and skills, had an even 
stronger impact on workplace dispute resolution, including associations with greater due 
process protections in procedures, reduced levels of workplace conflict, and lower grievance 
rates. There is an element of complementarity in these findings. Ideally, employees should 
prefer effective grievance procedures that they do not need to use too frequently due to fewer 
adverse decisions in the workplace. The combination of high involvement work systems that 
reduce underlying levels of conflict, and non-union grievance procedures with stronger due 
process protections that are more effective at resolving conflicts that do arise, appear to 
provide this desirable combination of circumstances.  
 
Impacts on Employees and the Workplace 
 
              So far the discussion has focused on how non-union grievance procedures operate in 
different organizations. But what does research tell us about the individual employee 
experience of using non-union grievance procedures?  
 
              Organizational justice theory suggests that to the degree that non-union grievance 
procedures enhance perceptions of justice in the workplace, we should see positive individual 
level attitudinal and behavioral responses from employees (Sheppard et al., 1992; Folger and 
Cropanzano, 1998). Research in this area has divided employee justice perceptions into 
separate constructs measuring perceptions of procedural justice, distributive justice, and 
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interpersonal justice (Colquitt, 2001). An important finding from this line of research is the 
greater importance of procedural justice perceptions over distributive justice perceptions in 
shaping attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. For grievance procedures, the implication is that 
we should anticipate that to the degree they provide enhanced procedural fairness in 
workplace decisions, they should produce positive outcomes beyond the degree to which they 
produce decisions favorable to employee grievants. The organizational justice theory-based 
propositions about the positive effects of non-union grievance procedures were tested in an 
experimental study by Olson-Buchanan (1996). She found that subjects who were given access 
to a grievance procedure were more likely to be willing to continue working for the 
organization.  
 
              Exit-voice theory provides similar predictions of positive effects from the adoption of 
nonunion grievance procedures. More specifically, exit-voice theory suggests that greater 
availability of voice options to remedy dissatisfaction with conditions should lead to reduced 
recourse to the exit option (Hirschman, 1970). In the workplace context, the classic example of 
this was the finding that the availability of the voice mechanism of union representation and 
grievance procedures was associated with lower rates of exit as seen in voluntary turnover or 
quit rates (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Batt et al., 2002). The direct applicability of this to 
grievance procedures was shown in a study by Rees (1991) which found that teacher quit rates 
were lower in school districts where the union contracts included stronger grievance 
procedures. Relatively little research has tested this proposition in the non-union setting. One 
study that tested it in the telecommunications industry found some weak evidence that non-
union peer review procedures are associated with lower quit rates, but no evidence for other 
types of nonunion grievance procedure (Batt et al., 2002). 
 
              A darker perspective on the workplace impact of non-union grievance procedures is 
suggested by research looking at retaliation against employees who use these procedures. A 
number of studies of unionized workplaces have found that employees who file grievances are 
subject to lower performance evaluations, greater likelihood of subsequent exit from the 
Grievance Procedures in Non-union Firms, 23 
 
organization, and other negative outcomes (Klaas and DeNisi, 1989; Boroff and Lewin, 1997; 
Lewin and Peterson, 1999). Similarly, in the non-union sector, Lewin (1990) found that in an 
organization with a non-union grievance procedure, employees who filed grievances were more 
likely to have negative performance evaluations in subsequent years. If these negative 
outcomes reflect retaliation against the employee for using the grievance procedure, then this 
has the potential to undermine the effectiveness of the procedure and discourage future use. 
However, it is difficult for research to identify the degree to which negative outcomes for 
grievance filers reflect actual retaliation or a post-grievance deterioration in the employee’s 
performance, or commitment to the organization. By contrast, in a study that controlled for the 
perceived mistreatment experienced by the employee, Boswell and Olson-Buchanan (2004) 
found that grievance filers did not have significantly worse exit and neglect related attitudes 
and intentions. While further research on this question would be valuable, it is clear that the 
potential for retribution is a danger for non-union grievance procedures and one that it would 
be well advised for organizations to guard against. 
 
Cross-National Variation in Non-Union Grievance Procedures 
  
So far the discussion has focused on research on non-union grievance procedures in the 
United States. This reflects in part the reality of the large non-union sector of the American 
workforce and the high degree of experimentation and innovation by American organizations in 
this area. The result is that the major body of the research on this topic has used American 
organizations as its setting. However, many other countries now have sizable and growing 
numbers of workers who are not represented by unions. 
 
What do we know about grievance procedures for these non-union workers outside of  
the United States? Non-union grievance procedures have not been a major phenomenon in the 
coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001), such as Germany, France, and most of 
continental Europe. In particular, nations where collective bargaining is centralized and contract 
coverage extended to most of the workforce lack the defined non-union sector that has been 
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the center of innovation in grievance procedures. In addition, many of these countries have 
public employment dispute resolution procedures that are used with much higher frequency by 
workers than the more complex and expensive American litigation system. For example, in 
Germany and France, the percentage of the workforce submitting an employment claim 
through their respective public procedures was 1.5% and 0.7% in 2002 respectively (Gibbons, 
2007). By contrast, in the liberal market economies, particularly the Anglo-American countries, 
the large and growing non-union sector has seen greater variation and innovation in 
employment relations practices including non-union grievance procedures (Colvin and 
Darbishire, 2012). 
 
Among the liberal market economies, Canada provides the closest comparator to the 
United States given the two nations’ high levels of economic and cultural integration. A long 
line of research has noted that, despite these similarities, the relatively more labor favorable 
legal regime in Canada has produced a much higher union representation rate of just under 
30%, compared to around 12% in the United States (Godard, 2003). However, this still means 
that over 70% of the Canadian workforce is in the non-union sector. Non-union grievance 
procedures are widespread in Canada as in the United States. In a comparative study of 
organizations in the American state of Pennsylvania and the Canadian province of Ontario, I 
found that while 60% of American organizations had adopted non-union grievance procedures, 
some 46% of Canadian organizations had also adopted non-union grievance procedures (Colvin, 
2006). Interestingly, despite Canada following a just cause standard for dismissals compared to 
the American employment at will rule, the higher adoption rate for non-union grievance 
procedures in the United States was in part a result of greater concerns about litigation among 
the American organizations. What this likely reflects is the greater uncertainty and risk created 
by the high damages and variability of outcomes in the American litigation system compared to 
a more employee favorable but relatively predictable employment law regime in Canada 
(Colvin, 2006). Among Canadian organizations, the predictors of non-union grievance procedure 
presence are similar to those found in the United States. Analysis of data from the Canadian 
Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) showed that presence of non-union grievance 
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procedures was associated with the use of high involvement work organization practices 
(Colvin, 2004b). 
 
Other liberal market economies have substantial non-union sectors, but it is not evident 
that patterns of development of procedures parallel the North American experience. A survey 
of non-union multinationals in the Republic of Ireland found that almost all had some type of 
formal conflict management procedures, but relatively few of these companies used more 
advanced ADR procedures such as arbitration, peer review, or ombudspersons (Doherty and 
Teague, 2011). Relatedly, in a study of Irish commercial enterprises, Roche and Teague (2012) 
found that innovations in ADR procedures were more likely where unions were recognized as 
compared to non-union settings. This was true for individually focused ADR procedures, such as 
using review panels or external experts to resolve grievances and group focused ADR 
procedures such as assisted negotiations and external arbitrators. The one exception to this 
pattern was that brainstorming problem solving procedures were more common in non-union 
enterprises. Overall however, Roche and Teague conclude that “[i]n the USA, firms adopting 
ADR inspired conflict management practices are doing so to address individual-based disputes 
and grievances, and as part of more general union substitution strategies, whereas in Ireland 
innovating firms tend more commonly to be unionized and are focusing on group based conflict 
management” (2012: 545). 
 
Evidence from the United Kingdom suggests that the expansion of non-union  
Workplaces in that country is producing a shift in the mode of expression of conflict. Analyzing 
data from the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey, Dix, Sisson, and Forth (2009) find 
that while rates of industrial action are much lower in non-union workplaces, claims to 
employment tribunals are higher where there are non-union voice mechanisms or no voice 
mechanism than where there are union voice mechanisms in the workplace. Interestingly in 
their results, the proportion of workplace with non-union voice mechanisms experiencing 
grievances was relatively similar to the proportion of workplaces with union voice mechanisms 
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with grievances, 40% versus 45% respectively (Dix et al., 2009). 
 
At the level of public policy, the United Kingdom undertook a more direct approach to 
encouraging the expansion of workplace grievance procedures with the enactment of a 
statutory dispute resolution procedure in 2004. The 2004 Act required organizations to follow a 
three-step procedure for discipline and workplace grievances, involving: the disciplinary 
decision or grievance being put in writing; a meeting being held to discuss the issue; and a 
procedure for the employee to appeal the decision (Harris, Tuckman, and Snook, 2012). Failure 
to follow the statutory grievance procedure would result in a dismissal being presumed to be 
unfair, and failure of the employee to first pursue the claim through the procedure would result 
in the subsequent dismissal of an employment tribunal claim. Problems with excessive 
formalization of processes and an emphasis on procedure over the substance of employment 
claims quickly led to pressure on the British government to revisit the statutory procedure 
requirement, which appointed an independent review commission (Harris et al., 2012). This 
resulted in the Gibbons (2007) report, which recommended the repeal of the statutory 
grievance procedure requirement. The statutory procedure provisions were repealed in 2009 
and replaced by a more flexible approach in which the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service (ACAS) developed a new Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures to 
serve as guidelines for organizations but without the previous preclusive effect on claims. As 
yet it is unclear what the effect of these shifts in public policy has had on the incidence of 
grievance procedures in the UK, particularly in workplaces where unions are not recognized. 
 
Conclusion 
 
When we survey the landscape of employment relations, it is clear that non-union 
grievance procedures have become an important institution in the workplace. Most notably in 
the United States, with its largely non-union labor force, non-union grievance procedures are 
the primary structure for most employees for addressing conflict in the workplace. Although 
still limited in extent, current research in this area allows us to identify some key features of 
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this phenomenon. First, non-union grievance procedures are characterized by a high degree of 
diversity in their incidence, origins, structure, and operations. Rather than a uniform system of 
conflict management of the type we see in union grievance procedures or public dispute 
resolution systems, non-union grievance procedures are idiosyncratic to the individual 
organization and vary widely in their key features. Much as we have seen growing variation in 
patterns of human resource practices between organizations and widening income inequality 
across the economy, so also in the rise of non-union grievance procedures are we seeing rising 
inequality in access to justice in the workplace. 
 
Second, research indicates that the nature of non-union grievance procedures matters  
for important employee and workplace outcomes. Many non-union grievance procedures are 
relatively simple structures with only managerial decision-makers and low levels of usage by 
employees. But we have also seen the expansion of procedures that use nonmanagerial 
decision-makers, such as peer review panels and outside neutral mediators and arbitrators, and 
these procedures are used more frequently by employees with greater levels of success in 
challenging workplace decisions. Third, non-union grievance procedures do not exist in isolation 
within the organization. Research in the United States has shown that the expansion and 
quality of non-union grievance procedures are highly influenced by the nature of external 
institutional pressures from the legal system and from union organizing threats. Looking across 
countries, the public policy environment is a key determinant of whether or not non-union 
grievance procedures are likely to develop as a significant phenomenon in nations other than 
the United States. 
 
What are the important unanswered questions about non-union grievance procedures? 
One of the most significant is the basic question of what is the distribution of procedures. 
Research in the United States suggests that more than half of non-union organizations have 
some type of formal procedure and that there is wide variation in the nature and structure of 
these procedures. However, we lack good data on the exact distribution of different types of 
procedures and how this distribution has changed over time. Data on non-union grievance 
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procedures from other countries are generally even more limited. Systematic national level 
survey data would allow us to understand the incidence and structure of procedures, as well as 
to investigate further questions such as the factors that determine the types of procedures that 
are adopted.  
 
A second area in need of further research is the question of what impacts non-union 
grievance procedures have in the workplace. Research suggests some positive impacts in the 
ability of employees to challenge unfair decisions and in the enhancement of organizational 
justice perceptions. However, among the most troubling of existing research findings is Lewin’s 
(1990) identification of retaliation against both grievance filers and supervisors of grievants. It 
suggests the importance of identifying how frequent is retaliation and what factors lead to 
retaliation or what policies or practices might be effective in preventing retaliation. 
Furthermore, we know little about the potential indirect effect of non-union grievance 
procedures in the workplace. Does the potential for having their decisions reviewed through 
procedures cause managers to be more careful and prudent in their workplace decision-
making? Do employees engage in positive workplace behaviors because they perceive that non-
union grievance procedures protect them from unfair adverse decisions? 
 
Last, relatively little attention has been paid to the question of representation in  
Nonunion grievance procedures. One of the main contrasts to grievance procedures in (p. 186) 
unionized workplaces, where the union provides employees with an institutional structure for 
representation, is that in non-union procedures the employee is typically unrepresented. He or 
she must file and present the grievance on his or her own. This may be a daunting task for many 
employees and hinder effective use of the procedure. Although notionally an employee might 
hire an attorney to provide representation, in practice this is likely to be prohibitively expensive 
and management may not allow an outside representative to participate in the process. In 
some organizations, human resource managers may serve as representatives of employee 
grievance and partially fill this gap (Colvin, 2004a). However, this creates a natural conflict of 
interests since they remain employees of the company and so this may only be effective where 
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the issues involved are more lateral conflicts in the workplace and do not implicate hierarchical 
conflicts with the employer or external rights. More broadly, the question of how to provide 
effective representation for non-union employees is one that challenges both the operation of 
non-union grievance procedures and that of employment relations more generally in the non-
union workplace. 
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